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The fetish of the lens: persistent sexist and ableist metaphor in 
education research 
 
The scientific metaphor of the lens remains widely used in qualitative education 
research, despite critiques of positivism. Drawing on two recently empirical 
doctoral studies and a subsequent small study informed by institutional 
ethnography, we propose that the attachment to the lens is a fetish. We argue that 
this fetish, evident even in purportedly feminist, post positivist and inclusive 
research, emerges from fascination with masculinist and ableist power predicated 
on the othering of the feminine, and the differently abled. Recourse to the 
language of power proves irresistible, if dangerous, for academics. We call for 
caution in the casual use of the lens and for new linguistic research repertoires 
that produce reality differently. 
Keywords: metaphor; inclusive education; feminism; gender studies; lens 
Subject classification codes: include these here if the journal requires them 
Introduction: Falling out with metaphor 
This theoretical discussion draws on empirical research from two recently completed 
doctoral studies and a small subsequent study undertaken by early career researchers 
“othered” by particular metaphoric conceptions that are used in research narratives, in 
presentations, and in everyday conversation. Belinda is a fully sighted mother returning 
to work as a lecturer in her forties, and Mark is a younger vision impaired male lecturer 
without children. Mark’s discipline is Disability Studies in Education, while Belinda’s 
is Gender Studies in Education. 
  In 2014 we were invited to speak at a symposium on metaphor in research, as 
we had both used metaphor explicitly in our doctoral theses. There we discovered our 
shared debt to, and disillusionment with, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s classic and 
much-cited Metaphors we live by (1980), a text that helps readers “see” metaphor, as its 
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blurb promises. We have subsequently met, talked and emailed, collecting examples of 
metaphor to fuel our discussion while developing our position on the ethical and 
methodological language choices that have contributed to our “othering”. We seek to 
share this discussion with other researchers and offer our ideas as provocation and 
incitement to acknowledge and relinquish the fetish of the lens. 
We present this discussion with an introduction providing background to our 
interests in metaphor and to our doctoral studies, specifically in relation to our 
simultaneously evolving impatience with Lakoff and Johnson (1980). We then 
introduce our theoretical resources for this subsequent study, in particular Dorothy 
Smith’s (2005) institutional ethnography and Stuart Hall’s (1997) elucidation of the 
fetish to trouble the language of metaphor. We close with a critique of popular 
metaphors in use in educational research to demonstrate the pervasiveness of sexist, 
ableist and humanist representational logic via the lens. 
Blurring the boundaries 
Mary Catherine Bateson proposes that: 
The most creative thinking occurs at the meeting places of disciplines. At the 
centre of any tradition it is easy to become blind to alternatives. At the edges, 
where lines are blurred, it is easier to imagine that the world might be different. 
(cited in Jacobsen et al, 2014, p. 1) 
This quotation invokes the troubling construction of augmented vision as knowledge 
and blindness as ignorance. Blind spots must be fixed, if one complies with a positivist 
system of representation and the pursuit of truth via precision vision. As John Wagner 
for example, also insists, "materials that provoke scientists to ask new questions 
illuminate blind spots, areas in which existing theories, methods, and perceptions 
actually keep us from seeing phenomena as clearly as we might"(1993 p. 16). Both 
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Bateson and Wagner urge researchers to think differently about research, data, 
discipline and analysis; to overcome blindness as ignorance and to formulate 
substitutes. 
Bateson also invokes the centres of traditions and disciplines, places held, 
historically, by men (Spender, 1982) and by positivism (as described by St Pierre, 
2012). The place of clear vision, the centre, the point of view is occupied by a humanist 
man-scientist and his instruments. Why is this “view” still informing research, despite 
decades of feminist and poststructuralist critique, and when ontology has been so 
effectively brought to the fore (St Pierre, 2013)? To dabble at the blurry edges is still to 
risk exclusion from the circle. 
Nevertheless we also recognise in a more affirmative sense how Bateson 
suggests the creative dialogue between us that has led to this article, by way of our 
shared examples of the pervasiveness of humanist representation. Here we seek to blur 
the lines between our respective disciplines and our acknowledged preoccupations, to 
combine the imperatives of feminism and inclusive education, and to resist the fetish of 
the lens—that convex circle of glass that controls light, that distances the viewer from 
the viewed, yet that makes everything clear. 
So we link the ableist worship of vision identified by Mark, and Belinda’s 
critique of phallogocentrism as both the visual and phallic take shape in the metaphor of 
the lens. Even prior to contemplating the phallic nature of the lens as magnifying glass, 
telescope or camera prosthesis,  we understand that vision is the most vectoral of the 
senses, giving masculine purpose and direction to research, resulting in an easily 
identifiable end product (Grumet, 1988, p. 24) and promoting the application of 
instruments in both research and education. Yet to our despair, we have found that even 
research that interrogates positivist regimes of vision, and the fetishizing of methods 
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abhors blindness. Bartholome, for example, decries the pursuit of methods of teaching 
to fix poor performance and seeks “less visible” (1994, p. 173) understandings of 
disadvantage yet warns: 
it is erroneous to assume that blind replication of instructional programs or teacher 
mastery of particular teaching methods, in and of themselves, will guarantee 
successful student learning, especially when we are discussing populations that 
historically have been mistreated and miseducated by the schools (1994, p. 173). 
Through our new critical reading, we have entered an ironic world where research 
purporting to be the most inclusive or feminist, still insists on the lens, or on vision as 
knowledge, in the most offensive ways. It is the world in which Metaphors we live by 
(1980), with its sexist and ableist visual figurations, has been cited over 42,000 times 
(Google Scholar, 2016). We will suggest that this is no coincidence and that it is the 
fetishization of the lens, concealing the worship of both phallus and perfection, that has 
led to reliance on these dangerous metaphors. 
Forming a research interest 
After our presentations at the metaphor seminar, with our sensibilities heightened by our 
interaction, our spontaneous and organic exchange of found exclusionist metaphor 
gradually began to take the form of research rather than anecdote. We sought to notice 
and share how we found visual and masculinist metaphors used in our everyday 
reading, rather than through any deliberate literature review. In this sense, we undertook 
a kind of institutional ethnography; at work we both read widely in the fields of gender 
and disability studies to source references for the courses we teach, and to inform our 
other research. Belinda, for example, first read the Bateson quote early in this article 
cited in a chapter on visual research methods (Jacobsen et al, 2014) informing another 
paper she is writing.  
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Dorothy Smith (2005) describes institutional ethnography as a project of 
exploration of the everyday world from particular standpoints within that world, 
standpoints that are understood to be shifting and never fixed, unlike the standpoint of 
liberal humanism (Lather, 2013, p. 634). We emphasise that we do not think of the 
metaphor of standpoint as facilitating only particular points of “view”, but as a 
multisensorial and embodied situatedness always emerging. 
We think about how the texts we encounter “perform” (Smith, 2005, p. 101) at 
the junctures of our own desktops and broader ruling relations imbued with ableism and 
sexism, the structures that we struggle against every day. Mark, for example, frequently 
struggles to access the materials he seeks to read. Belinda struggles to get to meetings 
inevitably planned at school pick up time. Meanwhile, in our reading, the man-scientist 
with his lens, unencumbered (or indeed, advantaged) by a vision impairment or two 
young children, is invoked again and again. It would be impossible to do a formal 
review of the use of the word “lens” in the literature of qualitative educational research; 
this man-scientist tool is invoked by countless academics, in countless papers.  
Smith (2005) argues that texts are not discrete, but create their meaning through 
what we do with them and how they transform us; so while we do bring our skills in 
discourse analysis to our discussions of texts in this article, we do not consider 
ourselves to be applying a feminist or disability studies “lens”, but creating new 
readings in a performative and reflexive fashion. We are open to critique of our own 
metaphors, in particular those that reveal our White, middle class backgrounds and 
biases. This ubiquitous use of the “lens” in research, however, became apparent, even in 
recent work, even despite decades of poststructuralist critique at the boundaries, or in 
the ruins, or even after humanism (Braidotti, 2013) and we became interested in the 
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particular persistence of this term; this is the problematic (Smith, 2005) emerging from 
our accounts of our reading, rather than a positivist pre-determined research question. 
Senses attuned to the language of the lens through our dialogue, we were 
surprised to realise how even our favourite academic writers use it, in our respective 
fields. Lani Florian and Jennifer Spratt, for example, on whom we both draw for 
inclusive pedagogies in our teaching, present a framework conceived as “a lens to guide 
research on developing the inclusive practices of primary and secondary classroom 
teachers” (Florian, 2013, p. 19). Lisa Mazzei reads data relating to women’s 
experiences of academia “through a new materialist lens” (2013, p. 776), to create 
generative new methodological approaches. We also noted linked phallic and luminary 
metaphors, as in “it is far more illuminating to drill down into how groups of students in 
particular year levels are faring” (Reid, 2016, p. 1).  
We now deliberately avoid the use of the lens, and call for a more conscious, 
cautious and creative use of this term in all education research and ask other researchers 
to pause before using it, pause to listen to what Rosi Braidotti (2013), after George 
Eliot, calls the roar of the universe—a cacophony blunting the power of humanist 
language. While we refer most often to the lens here, our discussion is relevant to all the 
entailments of the overarching metaphor of positivist, humanist, masculinist and ableist 
vision as wisdom. We think with Mikhail Bakhtin (1981), with Stuart Hall (1997), with 
Braidotti (2013) and with the philosophers of the 2013 special issue of the International 
Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education on post-qualitative research, particularly 
Patti Lather (2013) and Elizabeth Adams St Pierre (2013), as we further explore the 
interests triggered by our doctoral studies during which we first became concerned with 
metaphor. 
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Belinda’s doctoral study: The glitterbomb 
Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors we live by (1980) proved useful for my study of 
teachers designing curriculum around girls’ culture. Their analysis of metaphor 
suggested problematic entailments complicating my understanding of my study as a war 
against neoliberal influences in education. This war metaphor was troublingly 
masculine and combative; in what was couched as a feminist and collaborative project, I 
had positioned teachers as my soldiers and reinforced neoliberalism as a monolithic 
mass, as well as adopting a coercive feminist stance. 
Instead I sought to develop the Bakhtinian-inspired trope of the glitterbomb 
(Author, 2015): feminine; feminist; effete yet with impact; charged with gay activism 
and showgirl power, yet exploring the everyday work of teachers. This was a metaphor 
both glamorous and mundane, with centripetal and centrifugal forces competing in 
education, research and thesis writing and an epistemology in which knowledge was 
simultaneously pinned down and spinning away. The glitterbomb enabled me to think 
critically about other educational metaphors, including English teachers understandings 
of “framing” a text (Author 2015). 
As research design, the glitterbomb helped me avoid “lenses” and “data” and 
other trappings of positivist research and begin to gesture towards more post- qualitative 
(St Pierre, 2014) thinking. Yet each time I returned to Metaphors we live by, I 
increasingly supressed a frown, grimace and shrug. While Lakoff and Johnson may 
have scaffolded my understanding of metaphor, I was becoming increasingly uneasy 
with their language. They had informed my own reflexive critique… but where was 
their own? 
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Mark’s doctoral study: Insider accounts of inclusion 
My familiarity with living with impairment fuels my conviction that working the 
complexities of everyday schooling and the embodiment of impairment, by producing 
alternative knowledge based on personal experience and that of young people with 
diagnosed special education needs, might well lead to an education that is affirmative 
towards disability. Using words (nouns and verbs) I insist that it is plausible to 'speak' 
inclusiveness into action. An understanding of metaphor would seem to support this 
aim. I want to believe in Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) convincing argument that 
metaphor expedites creative explanations of abstract notions. After all, to conceive of an 
education system equipped with the theoretical and practical resources to facilitate 
inclusiveness of students with disabilities seems to some, overly abstract. At the same 
time, I want to have confidence in the resolve that commonplace experience of 
disability can make "a difference where ‘difference’ can be understood as a gift, an 
occasion to trouble normalcy and to experience it as a troubling thing" (Michalko, 2009, 
p. 72). 
Nevertheless, during my doctorate, my sense of discomfort developed steadily 
as I realised that, co-opted by the language of normativity, inclusive education research, 
disability policy and participants, I myself routinely make ableist references to 
normalcy, to standardised embodiment, to normal function and to biological 
determinism. In my thesis I wrote of receiving a 'special' stamp on commencement of 
my schooling that would indelibly mark me as a student in need of particular support 
needs (Author, 2014). Visible only to those who can see it (not me of course), the 
ineradicable ink would: recurrently define my dependence; mark me out as different 
from the rest of the school population; and have me relegated to the back of the 
classroom with the inescapable teacher aide. The stamp, I would later come to realise, 
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ostensibly impacted my educational career in a way contrary to Plato's Ring of Gyges 
(Frede, 2013)—a jewel gifting the wearer complete invisibility. 
Restrictive metaphors in use to disparage disability, similar to my stamp of 
erasure, have been highlighted elsewhere. For example, autism is often referred to in 
terms of a type of machinery (Danforth & Naraian, 2007) while attention deficit and 
hyperactive disorder has also been identified as a form of imprisonment (Danforth & 
Kim, 2008). Worryingly, these metaphors are—according to Lakoff and Johnson—
products of our ontological selves. As they note, "the kind of conceptual system[s] we 
have is a product of the kind of beings we are and the way we interact with our physical 
and cultural environments (1980, p. 119). Except, perhaps, when our own ontological 
compositions are askew. Understanding through Lakoff and Johnson's work that all 
linguistic conceptualisation may be metaphoric, I suggest that any gesture they make to 
emancipation is instead complicit with ableist, and by definition marginalising, 
sensibilities. 
Metaphors White, able-bodied men live by 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) describe the pervasive nature of metaphor and the 
metaphorical basis for fundamental conceptual systems. They argue that we are not 
aware of our conceptual systems, yet can find out about these systems by “looking at 
language” to gain “insight” (1980, p. 3). Their apparently apolitical posturing, as 
scientists examining language through a lens, and their failure to interrogate their own 
language leaves them wide open to the critique we perform here, critique that we hope 
will trouble the reliance of educational research on the lens. 
In a single paragraph, Lakoff and Johnson say that when we disagree with each 
other we “may lose sight” of aspects of argument, that an opponent can be “viewed as 
giving you his time” and that we “often lose sight of cooperation” (1980, p. 10). This 
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visual metaphor, of perception as vision, is ironically never explored in their own work. 
This is a particular kind of vision, too: White, male and middle class. We argue that 
Lakoff and Johnson’s work is far from neutral, but imbued with exclusionary politics 
that purposefully acquire power through the othering of women and other-than-able-
bodies, those who do not conform to the embodiment of the sighted male eyes of 
humanist vision intensified by the lens. Who is this man? He is Braidotti’s  “He man”, 
Protagorus, “the measure of all things” (2013, p. 13). He is Leonardo da Vinci’s pale 
and exquisitely drawn Vitruvian man, with a monocle, or perhaps not, as perfection 
cannot be enhanced. He is normative humanism, “regulatory and instrumental to 
practices of exclusion and discrimination” (2013, p. 26), and the othering that we feel. 
The absence of awareness of sexual politics in Metaphors we live by borders on 
the hilarious at times. Lakoff and Johnson claim, quite earnestly and unselfconsciously, 
that “drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture 
with a positive emotional state” (1980, p. 15). Their handy yet extraordinarily skewed 
lists of examples carry all masculine pronouns: 
It’s hard to get the word across to him. 
His words carry little meaning. 
“He”, “his” and “him” reign until Chapter Four, where, under the heading, HAVING 
CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS 
DOWN, we read “I have no control over her” (1980, p. 15). We learn that CONTROL 
IS UP thus provides a basis for MAN IS UP and therefore for RATIONAL IS UP 
(1980, p. 17). Power seems irresistibly conceived through metaphors of phallic 
verticality. It begins to feel extraordinary that the authors attest to the cultural and 
experiential bases for metaphor, yet do not even begin to ponder whose culture and 
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experience this is, or who might be privileged in these examples. Multiple winces 
follow: 
She saw getting married as the solution to her problems. (p. 27) 
She’s just a pretty face. (p. 37) 
He is the father of modern biology. (p. 47) 
He has a barren mind. (p. 47) 
He invited a sexy blonde to our dinner party. (p. 163) 
Many further examples invoke the tensile world of masculine power: automobiles, 
wheels, ships, windshield wipers, races, inflation, war, butts, buttresses, Fords, guns, 
buses, Nixon, Napoleon, the White House and the Kremlin. More broadly sketched 
metaphors are also those of masculine power, of construction and building, for example, 
and of penetration, as we delve deeply into topics (1980, p. 101). Yet these are 
accompanied by breath-taking failures to perceive this, in the call to critique the ways 
metaphors are imposed by people in power (1980, p. 160), rejections of objective truth, 
and even the thoughtless warning that “the blind acceptance of metaphor can hide 
degrading realities” (1980, p. 237). In an afterword, Lakoff and Johnson congratulate 
themselves on grasping the possibility of “seeing beyond the ‘truths’ of our culture” 
(1980, p. 239). These ironies would be delicious if they were not so discriminatory, so 
contaminated with ableist and sexist language. 
Metaphor as fetish 
At risk of seeming as if we are catching fish in a barrel, critiquing two men writing in 
1980, when in many countries of the so-called West, women were still their husband’s 
chattels and disabled people were routinely segregated, we seek to put forward our 
argument as to why the lens is so persistent: metaphor, in this case, as Lakoff and 
Johnson so ably demonstrate, is fetish. In our construction of the notion of fetish, we 
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rely on Stuart Hall’s (1997) definition of fetishism as looking but not looking, as using a 
decoy to cover illicit desire, as ambivalence, as using and not using, indulging and 
denying.  Metaphor is substitution of one thing for another, as Belinda learnt from her 
Literary Studies textbook in 1984 (Abrams, 1981, p. 63). It is a small shift to query how 
this substitution might facilitate adulation of the forbidden, with vehicle (substitute 
word) allowing us to countenance tenor (subject) without shame.  
So ships and cars and indeed lenses become substitutions for the phallus, which 
is itself taboo (Hall, 1997, p. 266) and yet we can glory in its representatives. Science, 
in particular, and grammars become the covers that enable the terrible systemacities of 
metaphorical exclusion, they licence for us the power of exclusion, of making other. 
Lakoff and Johnson can perform brute patriarchy under the guise of linguistic analysis, 
celebrating under cover the phallus that completes the true human. The lens allows us 
the prop of humane reason, allows us to look but not look at our subjects, to pretend we 
are interested in anything other than their subjugation, in anything other than delighting 
in our superiority and distancing us from the passive subject. 
Hall uses the lens in his own description of fetishism, showing a caricature of a 
portly middle aged man in breeches, with fob watch, peering through a Priapic telescope 
at the naked buttocks of a Black woman (1997, p. 269). He uses this example to show 
how the sexual nature of the gaze can be disavowed. We are interested in thinking about 
how the lens, even when invoked in the clinical spaces of evidence-based education 
research, is always sexual, always used to assert or borrow masculine power and to 
participate in the marginalisation of the feminine in the utterly gendered (Macoun & 
Miller, 2014) activities of academia. 
But what of the persistence of this metaphor despite earlier critiques of 
positivism? The lens is the tool of conqueror, navigator, sailor, surveyor, doctor; it 
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forms cameras, telescopes, periscopes, microscopes, lights, specula, monocles, spy 
glasses. Anyone who takes up the lens takes up its entailments as well, from the gilt 
braid on Captain Cook’s jacket, to the jaunty bow tie worn by the consultant on ward 
rounds. It has fascinated us, since we became alert to the ubiquity of exclusion via 
metaphor, how it seemed most tenacious even in fields antithetical to positivism. St 
Pierre describes her students wrestling with positivist language even as they deliberately 
try to do post-qualitative research, to move beyond “the idea that only what can be seen 
and measured is valuable” (2014, p. 7). 
The lens is used in the arts, literature, feminist research (the feminist lens seems 
a particularly ironic oxymoron) and inclusive education. Recently Belinda has been 
invited to give a talk to senior secondary Literature teachers on critical theory lenses 
including feminism and post colonialism, as dictated by new State curriculum 
requirements (Victorian Curriculum and Assessment Authority, 2016). A key 
recommended resource for this new emphasis is Through the literary looking glass: 
Critical theory in practice (Evans, 2012). 
The lens posits literature as not just corpus, but as corpse, as cadaver awaiting 
dissection and microscopic analysis. The lens fixes particular ontologies and 
epistemologies antithetical to the creative and the personal. Given the seemingly endless 
struggle to bring pre-service educators and research students along with us to a place 
where, beyond mere lip service, theory and practice are indeed inextricably linked, the 
restrictions imposed by the use of a lens fortify positivism. 
Ableist tools 
Empirical and conceptual work in inclusive education is often represented through and 
by positivist language. Continuing the theme 'seeing is knowing', inclusive education is 
habitually viewed through a lens—an act that both positions education away from the 
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researcher at a distance, and presumes that an accurate image awaits the objective, 
visually-able gaze. For instance, "before we can talk about what diversity is … it is 
important to first examine the individual, personal lens through which we view today's 
diverse world and how we see ourselves fitting in" (Cooper, He & Levin, 2011, p. 24).  
If inclusive education 'starts with ourselves' and is therefore everyone's business 
(Slee, 2011), taking up a lens through which to 'examine' diversity, while disassociating 
ourselves by 'seeing how we fit in' is problematic to the project of inclusivity. Cooper, 
He and Levin define the lens by means of the terms 'individual' and 'personal'; the 
distance rendered between the diverse subject and the presumably 'normal' one using a 
technical  implement of rational examination facilitates "the objectivising of the 
subject" (Foucault, 1982, p. 777) whose otherness is observed by sight. Like previous 
exemplars, this metaphor suggests that the ideology of inclusivity belongs to the 
objective, eagle-eyed overseer, the sole expert in the conditions required for justice and 
equity. This overseer is a quick-change-artist. He is also the benevolent man-scientist, 
the imperialist explorer of uncharted realms, and the gowned-up male pioneering 
professor, with spectacles, eye glass, telescope.  
Unless the lenses used are wide-angle, however, the narrow focal point provided 
by the optical instrument limits the overseer’s identification of the complexities inherent 
in schooling today that detract from inclusiveness. In global guidelines on inclusive 
education development from 2009, The United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) advises that "looking at education through an 
inclusive lens implies a shift from seeing the child as the problem to seeing the 
education system as the problem" (p. 14). This time we are encouraged to equip 
ourselves with an 'inclusive lens'—that must itself have a wide angle—to 'look' through 
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it, and to 'see' 'problems' that at first may appear child-centred, but upon a second 'look' 
will reveal themselves as systemic. 
To some extent, this metaphor is hopeful—it encourages the user of the 
'inclusive lens' (2009) to consider multiple perspectives on what impedes inclusive 
schooling. However, the metaphor of the lens again enables the overseer to disassociate 
from the project of inclusive education. Multiple alternate ways of coming to know are 
elided, including the significance of embodiment, emotion and affect (Shildrick, 2012), 
and desires and needs (Allan, 2015). We ask why it is necessary to look at people 
through lenses, unless it is to covertly access particular kinds of politically incorrect 
power that this this metaphor licences, and to indulge in Hall’s (1997) looking but not 
looking, at the spectacle of the aberration, the disabled “other” (Shildrick, 2012; Author, 
2014). 
The reflexive lens 
Before we conclude this cross-disciplinary exploration of phallic and ableist 
language, one last exemplar from Mark. In my own doctoral thesis, to answer the 
research question I “turn the analytical lens inward and upward" (Author, 2015a, p. 
147). On reflection, this is a contortionist feat that smacks of both pleasure and pain, 
and demonstrates the symbolic violence enacted through this seductively clinical and 
neutral metaphor. My extraordinary attempt to bend the lens metaphor into reflexivity is 
closely followed by a subsequent paper in which I "make the case for the analysis of 
inclusive schooling through the lens of students’ ‘included’ subjectivities" (Author, 
2015b, p. 1). This awkward admission that I too have resorted to ableist metaphor in 
recent work relates to my ontological and epistemological subjecthood as a researcher. 
Directing the analytical lens 'inward and upward' demonstrates my struggle with 
researcher positioning—my 'being' located simultaneously inside and below my work, 
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while 'knowing' through everyday personal experience how having a disability 
ostensibly authorises restricted admittance to "the realm of the social and political" 
(Michalko, 2009, p. 65). This is an uncomfortable position, common among people with 
disabilities shifting uneasily from renunciation of embodied difference to its embrace in 
attempting to be recognised as legitimately corporeal.  
I have come to understand that this confused and confusing position 
demonstrates my having bought into normative function to distance myself from the 
study of the politics of marginalisation, paradoxically while living it each day in random 
and often unpredictable ways. Evidently, I have also bought into empowerment through 
normalised linguistic practices and have used language about blindness, visuality or the 
ability to stare through the looking glass—portrayals that are patently distant from my 
own experiences and dis/abled subjecthood. I have sought, through metaphor, to be that 
man-scientist with his vision unimpaired, able to pity those who are “blind” or troubled 
by “blind spots”. I fetishise power, looking but not looking, as Hall (1997) describes, 
although in everyday life, looking is neither important to nor possible for me. 
The metaphors we have discussed, instead of challenging ableism, suggest 
adherence to dominant ways of being and knowing; and of manipulating a looking glass 
so as to see a clear, objective picture of the issues at hand, otherwise known as “truth”. 
That they do so while advising readers how to develop inclusive educational 
environments to create opportunities for people with diverse needs and ways of access 
is at once corrosive and insensitive. But we are not merely wincing at the insensitive 
language of others. As we demonstrate in our discussions of our own work, we too have 
been co-opted by language of ableism and attitudes that are comfortable with masculine 
dominance. We recognise that an ethic of inclusion, as Allan (2015) advocates, 
demands that we all take responsibility for actioning inclusion; that we all recognise our 
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position within the discourse of inclusive education; and that in so doing, we are 
conscious that we are all at risk of marginalisation. 
Metaphors [that we might] live by/through/as 
We have come to wonder if it is because many of our favourite authors, and we 
ourselves, write in these post-positivist or inclusive areas, that we feel we must employ 
the lens and co-opt masculine power; that we are free to use language that invokes 
normative ontologies. Do we feel particularly vulnerable if we are experimenting with 
creative or boundary-pushing research methodologies? Or is it that in the disciplines 
where phallicism is so disavowed, that we must fetishise it so trenchantly via the lens? 
Do those renouncing science most particularly crave the scientific gaze, for its capacity 
to 'pinpoint' something called normal?  St Pierre (2013) considers whether or not 
humanist qualitative inquiry can survive the ontological turn brought about via the 
posts; representational logic, via Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, Derrida, and 
Baudrillard,,can no longer assume an ontological position that separates language from 
reality. Instead, language produces reality, distorts it, and works with it in unanimity to 
create explanation. 
Taking up the posts, however, also requires that we are mindful of how we 
develop knowledge through our ontological positions; that we mind our Ps and Qs in 
the spirit of flattening hierarchies. As St Pierre reminds us (2013, p. 650) "one must 
rethink the assumptions of a representational logic that puts language to work in a 
certain way in the service of the real and the material if one is to rethink the ontology 
that logic makes possible." Following this discussion, we would argue that researchers 
who claim allegiances to the posts to draw our sensitivities to particular inequities, yet 
who insist on using metaphorical terms that are oblivious to alternate ways of being, 
produce research steeped in traditions of logical positivism and fail to press for change.  
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These concurrent concerns are evidence of our coming to learn and appreciate 
the ontological turn (St Pierre, 2013, p. 650), wherein the ethical task of research means 
"taking very seriously what we have wanted language to do in this world and what that 
desire has really, actually done in the making of the world." Following St Pierre, and 
cautioning to some extent the take up of metaphor as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) 
proclaim it, we urge researchers to be mindful that though easy-to-reach metaphor may 
be expressive, it is harder to seek terms that are affirmative of diverse ontologies. 
Conclusion: What we ask 
So we ask researchers who purport to work beyond positivism, and even beyond 
qualitative boundaries, why we still, after all we have been through in decades of 
feminist and poststructuralist and disability-related theory, need the lens. If the answer 
is that it affords an irresistible power, then we need to interrogate how it does this, and 
whether the answer sits comfortably with our ontologies and epistemologies. Are we 
complying with the dehumanising of anyone who is not an able-bodied man in that 
clever garment we are constructing in this paper, with its lab coat creases, military 
braid, regalia silks and myriad storage pockets and belts for binoculars and microscopes 
and the like? 
When we call this discursive entity into being by conceptualising research with 
the lens, when we invoke this figure in his clothes that we can only try to inhabit, we 
reinforce his dominance and our own deficits. We fetishise power and desire to borrow 
the gaze of the powerful, the ability to look but not look, to look but not have to 
understand anything other than our own mimed superiority. We believe that the lens 
persists not just because of a preference for scientific models and metaphors in 
neoliberal times, but because of patriarchy maintaining dominance through the othering 
of diverse genders and abilities. 
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The taking up of the lens seems to be a compulsion that is beyond our control. 
Every time we use the word “lens” to represent what we do as researchers, we are not 
just complicit, but actively shoring up prejudice, worshipping the phallus, and 
consigning those who are not perfect, in the Vitruvian sense, to the margins of our 
“gaze”. “Looking” seems unstoppable, a masculinist superpower unvanquished by 
multiple critiques of its gendered and ableist entailments beginning in the 1970s 
(Berger, 1972;  Mulvey, 1975). Looking through the lens is a gendered act, an ableist 
act, a positivist act, to achieve a specific, identifiable, repeatable, instrumental outcome. 
Generally, looking through a lens involves shutting one eye to rely on a mechanical 
prosthesis; as Hall (1997) says, looking, but not looking. What is it that we do not want 
to see, or long to see or must see even if we have to pretend we are not really looking?  
So we would like to think that readers of this article may begin to notice affect, 
to attend to the wince as their fingers start to type the word “lens” and to share our 
discomfort at the metaphors we live “by”. Even the title of Metaphors we live by 
suggests our separation from language, positioning these metaphors beside us, or as a 
code. Can we ban metaphor, impatient with its binary logic (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, 
p. 5) of this means that? This is a task beyond us as authors; we seek instead to perform 
better metaphors. Can we ban the lens, at least, or re-imagine it as part of a 
DeleuzoGuattarian machinic assemblage with multiple lenses, broken and intact, and 
ears and nerve endings and tongues all resisting organisation into a sensible human 
body (Braidotti, 2013)? With apron strings and stethoscopes and measuring tapes and 
shawl fringes all flying about? With canes and crutches and computer cords all at wild, 
wonderful angles, enacting Lather’s “multidirectionalities” (2013, p. 641)? 
Can we think with Braidotti’s (2013) version of becoming machine, becoming 
posthuman to flatten the man-scientist? Can we re-imagine glass in more creative ways 
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as a research metaphor, and think glass as more fascinating, desirable and useful when 
fractured, curved, bubbly, milky (blurry), bulging, aged and distorted? Or even go 
beyond the solid, to glass as liquid, molten, searing, shapely and blown? Can we think 
about the material qualities of glass and light to shift our understanding of the lens? Yet 
we are aware that other theorists have already gone there, with crystallisation 
(Richardson & St Pierre, 2008) or diffraction (Barad, 2007) to allow for complexity and 
change, and still the sharp-eyed man-scientist’s lens endures. Until we can confront our 
illicit desires for power and throw out the dominant cultural tropes of blindness as 
ignorance and the feminine as weak, we are stuck not only with the lens, but fixed in its 
sights. 
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